This paper find that politics worsens risk-shifting at government-led banks in India. Following a system-wide asset quality review that revealed state-owned banks to have large amounts of undisclosed bad loans, I find that higher government ownership led to larger ex post capital injections. These taxpayer-funded bailouts came with political strings: credit was reallocated toward electorally strategic but low-productivity borrowers. After recapitalization, undercapitalized state-owned banks expanded lending to zombie firms and politically connected clients, whereas private and better-capitalized banks improved loan quality. Comparing credit allocation at branches within the same state-owned bank, I find that branches in election constituencies increase zombie lending; the same banks' non-election branches do not. These patterns are absent at private banks or in off-election years. Politically driven credit crowds out politically unconnected private firms, which reduce investment by 7 percent, as an unintended consequence of supervision. Overall, ownership-targeted recapitalizations can undermine supervisory clean-ups by exacerbating risk-shifting and distorting real investment.Presented at (including upcoming): 6th RCF-ECGI Corporate Finance and Governance Conference 2025, the Bank of Finland's Banking Workshop 2024, and the Indian Management Research Conference at IIM Ahmedabad 2024.