Pranav Garg
Ph.D. Candidate in Financial Economics
Yale School of Management
I am on the 2026–27 academic job market.
Ph.D. Candidate in Financial Economics
Yale School of Management
I am on the 2026–27 academic job market.
Research areas: Corporate Finance, Financial Intermediation, Macro Finance, AI.
My research sheds light on under-explored frictions within corporate finance and financial intermediation, and how these interact with monetary policy and financial regulation.
During summer 2026, I was a dissertation fellow at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Before joining Yale, I was a predoctoral fellow at the Fama–Miller Center Chicago Booth. I received an MSc in Economics from the Paris School of Economics and previously held research positions at the Reserve Bank of India (Mumbai) and CEPII (Paris).
Job Market Paper
Who Insures Firms? Banking Regulation and the Supply of Corporate Liquidity Insurance
[Draft coming soon!]
References
Prof. Kelly Shue (Chair)
Yale School of Management
Prof. Andrew Metrick
Yale School of Management
Prof. Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham
Yale School of Management
paul.goldsmith-pinkham@yale.edu
Prof. Alp Simsek
Yale School of Management
Selected Research
Facing Default?, with Marius Guenzel, Shimon Kogan, Marina Niessner & Kelly Shue [Draft]
Lenders have long believed that personality and economic preferences matter for repayment, yet these characteristics remain difficult to measure at scale. We link LinkedIn profile images with credit records for over 800,000 U.S. borrowers and show that facial embeddings extracted using machine learning predict delinquency beyond credit scores, income, and education. Facial information raises the predictive power of credit score by one-third, with the largest gains among younger, lower income, less educated, and thin-file borrowers. These gains remain large within a demographically homogeneous subsample and after ranking predictions within sex-by-ethnicity groups. To understand why faces carry predictive power, we survey over 10,000 participants and train models to predict self-reported personality and economic preferences from their photographs. The resulting measures help account for facial embeddings’ predictive power for repayment: conscientiousness and patience predict lower delinquency, while risk-taking predicts higher delinquency. Our approach offers a scalable way to study the role of personality and preferences in credit markets. Incorporating facial information into credit screening could also expand credit access: in lending simulations, access for thin-file borrowers rises from 9% to 42% at a fixed portfolio delinquency rate. However, the growing use of facial information in industry screening raises ethical concerns about statistical discrimination and individual autonomy.
Monetary Transmission in Equity Markets: Evidence from Financial Intermediaries, with Matthew Famiglietti [Draft]
We show that heterogeneous equity flows across financial intermediaries amplify monetary policy transmission to asset prices. We find that mutual funds with performance-sensitive retail investors experience outflows after contractionary monetary shocks, triggering forced equity sales. Banks have funding that is insensitive to recent performance and therefore absorb these sales and provide liquidity. This intermediary-level heterogeneity aggregates meaningfully: stocks held by more performance-sensitive investors exhibit larger price declines following monetary tightening. To explain these patterns, we develop an intermediary asset pricing model where heterogeneous intermediaries manage portfolios for investors with performance-sensitive flows, highlighting a novel mechanism of monetary transmission to equities.
Insulated Leaders: Market Share and Earnings Cyclicality, with J. Weber [Draft]
Firms with high industry market shares are insulated from monetary policy. We show that following a contractionary shock, leaders’ cost of capital rises by less than that of lower-share competitors in the same industry: 13 basis points less per 100 basis points of shock for the top 2%, plus their investment and R&D fall by less. We outline a mechanism of earnings cyclicality, which leads to policy insulation and is independent of financial frictions. In our model, firms spend on customer relationships and long-term contracts to lock in a share of revenue that does not move with the cycle, more productive firms lock in more, and they are less exposed to the business cycle. Consistent with this, we show leaders’ revenue betas are about a third of those of bottom-half firms and that earnings-call language about recurring and contracted revenue tends to rise with market position. Within firms, more such language predicts also lower future cyclicality. Tightening thus shifts competitive advantage toward leaders, perhaps permanently.
Presented at: AFA Posters 2026, Midwest Macro Meetings at Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 2025.